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Michael Cole
Culture and Cognitive Science
Summary
The purpose of this paper is to review the way in which 
cultural contributions to human nature have been treat-
ed within the fi eld of cognitive science. I was initially 
motivated to write about this topic when invited to give 
a talk to a Cognitive Science department at a sister uni-
versity in California a few years ago. My goal, on that 
occasion, was to convince my audience, none of whom 
were predisposed to considering culture an integral part 
of cognitive science, that they would indeed benefi t 
from recognizing some affi nities between the ideas of 
some of the founders of cognitive science and ideas 
about culture emanating from the Soviet (now Russian) 
cultural-historical school. My task in presenting this 
argument to the readers of Outlines is most likely the 
mirror image of that earlier effort. On the one hand, the 
ideas of the cultural-historical school are well known 
to this readership and you do not need to be lectured 
on the topic by an American whose knowledge of the 
topic is no greater than your own. At best, the ways 
in which I have appropriated those ideas and put them 
to work might provide an opportunity to refl ect on the 
strange fate of ideas when they move between national 
traditions of thought. On the other hand, owing to a 
double twist of fate (after all, what was an American 
doing in Moscow in 1962 doing post-doctoral work in 
psychology) I was also present during the discussions 
leading to the founding of Cognitive Science in the 
early 1970’s and subsequently became a member of 
the Cognitive Science Program at UCSD in the early 
1980’s, arguably one of the pioneering efforts to insti-
tutionalize this new discipline.
 My hope is that this unusual confl uence of experi-
ences, and the ideas that they have generated, will be of 
some use to those who see value in a dialogue between 
these different intellectual projects. With this goal in 
mind, I will begin by providing my own brief history 
of key ideas associated with the origins of cognitive 
science. My presentation will of necessity be highly 
selective – it is the relevance of the inclusion of culture 
in cognitive science that is my major focus.
 I will then summarize some major milestones in 
the development of cognitive science at UCSD before 
turning to describe my own fusion of ideas from cul-
tural-historical psychology and cognitive science as a 
kind of existence proof of the potential value of inter-
disciplinary dialogue.
Culture and Cognitive 
 Science “In the Beginning”
Howard Gardner’s “authorized biography” 
of cognitive science which treats its early 
origins and development up to approximately 
two decades ago can serve as a useful point of 
departure (Gardner 1985). Gardner begins his 
account with a series of scientifi c and techni-
cal advances that took place across the 1940’s, 
50’s, and 60’s which set the stage for the new 
discipline. Among these were:
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1. The work of mathematicians such as Alan 
Turing and John von Neuman on comput-
ability and the feasibility of constructing 
computing machines that could work from 
programs stored in their own memories.
2. The work of Warren McCulloch and Walter 
Pitts showing that the operation of nerve 
cells and their connections to other nerve 
cells (neural networks) could be modeled 
in terms of logic.
3. Norbert Wiener’s work on cybernetics in 
which he explicitly linked understanding 
of the human nervous system, electronic 
computers, and the importance of feedback 
from the environment.
4. The work of Shannon and Weaver on the 
development of information theory and 
George Miller’s application of some of 
these ideas to the study of human memory 
in information processing terms.
5. Noam Chomsky’s formalizations of gram-
matical competence.
6. A growing belief that stimulus-response 
versions of behaviorism had failed to pro-
duce on their promise, presaging the so-
called cognitive revolution in psychology.
Responding to these and allied events, the Al-
fred Sloan Foundation sponsored a series of 
conferences bringing together representatives 
of the many disciplines implicated in Gard-
ner’s list of originators of cognitive science 
in the mid-1970’s to explore the wisdom of 
providing support for a new, academic enter-
prise that synthesized these varied, and already 
interacting trends. The Foundation did indeed 
provide startup funding for some large pro-
grams in Cognitive Science, in effect launching 
the new discipline.
In the story as told by Gardner, the Founda-
tion commissioned a “state of the art report” 
that summarized the ideas coming out of its 
series of conferences. The report declared the 
emergence of the fi eld of cognitive science, 
explaining this new fi eld in the following 
terms:
What has brought the fi eld into existence is a com-
mon research objective: to discover the represen-
tational and computational capacities of the mind 
and their structural and functional representation 
in the brain (p. 36).
The report’s authors represented the set of 
disciplines that had merged around this com-
mon objective as a “cognitive Hexagon” and 
attempted, through the use of dotted and solid 
lines to indicate the relationship among the 
constitutive disciplines (See Figure 1): Phi-
losophy, Linguistics, Neuroscience, Artifi cial 
Intelligence, Psychology, and Anthropology.
This report was never published. According 
to Gardner, scholars representing every node of 
the hexagon felt under-represented, misrepre-
sented, or otherwise in disagreement about the 
conceptual structure of the new discipline.
As a consequence of these divisions of 
opinion, combined with the fi rm resolve of 
Sloan to go ahead with its plans, a variety of 
differently constituted departments of cogni-
tive science were created that represented 
different coalitions formed by sub-sets of the 
cognitive hexagon. In some places Artifi cial 
Intelligence (AI) came together with Psychol-
ogy and Neuroscience; in others, Linguistics, 
Psychology, and AI, were combined, and so 
on. Common across all of these efforts was the 
centrality of modeling cognitive processes on 
digital computers.
Equally noticeable by its extreme rarity 
in the array of burgeoning cognitive science 
programs was the contribution of Anthropol-
ogy, the discipline which held title to the con-
cept of culture. Only in two major programs 
that I am aware of – the program put together 
at Berkeley (originally in collaboration with 
Stanford) and the program at UCSD – made 
the anthropological element of the cognitive 
hexagon a signifi cant part of its mix.
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Despite its failure to fulfi ll the ambitious 
goals of the Sloan Foundation’s broad vision of 
the fi eld, Gardner believed that the founders of 
cognitive science had made admirable progress 
toward their goal. The central achievement of 
this movement, as it appeared to Gardner in 
1984, was to demonstrate the centrality of 
representation, or as he put it, “the clear dem-
onstration of the validity of positing a level of 
mental representation: a set of constructs that 
can be invoked for the explanation of cognitive 
phenomena, ranging from visual perception to 
story comprehension (p. 383).
Writing only a few years later, Gardner 
noted two trends in the fi eld which he linked 
to accomplishments and trends set by the 
early progenitors of cognitive science in the 
1930-40’s (Gardner 1987). The fi rst was a 
vast increase in efforts to re-connect cogni-
tive psychology with the neurosciences – the 
individual’s mind with the individual’s brain. 










        Connections among the Cognitive Sciences
Key: Unbroken lines = strong interdisciplinary ties
        Broken lines = weak interdisciplinary ties
Figure 1
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modeling, which highlights parallel processes 
and reduces the relative centrality of repre-
sentation-as-internal-state. Gardner pointed to 
mixed systems employing combinations of the 
serial and parallel architectures as a promising 
way forward.
Curiously, in his retrospective look at the 
fi eld, Gardner (1987) neglected to comment 
on another change – the increased infl uence 
of ideas about culture and cognitively-moti-
vated ethnographic research as a signifi cant, 
and challenging, sector within the Cogni-
tive Science community. This seems an odd 
omission, because from remarks written in 
the earlier edition, we know that Gardner saw 
anthropology entering the fi eld through work 
of myself, Jean Lave, Sylvia Scribner, and Ed 
Hutchins. Our approaches, he wrote, provide 
one way “that the anthropological community 
can have its cake and eat it too. … by continu-
ing the careful case studies that have been the 
lifeblood of the fi eld, but to inform these stud-
ies with promising concepts or methods from 
cognitive science” (p. 256).
What Gardner could not see at the time, be-
cause the changes were taking place impercep-
tibly from individual scholars’ perspectives, 
but what the advantage of hindsight affords 
us, is the realization that several interconnected 
changes were occurring that, taken cumulative-
ly, were to bring about major new trends in the 
fi eld. He saw the fi rst serious challenge to the 
strong representationalist view in the work of 
Rumelhart, Norman, and McClelland on paral-
lel distributed processing systems. But he did 
not see the cascading series of elaborations of 
these ideas that has ensued over the past decade 
nor could he discern the growing interest of 
contemporary anthropologists, psychologists, 
and others in the study of cognition as situated 
action occurring in context, or what some term, 
“embodied cognition.” Each of these events 
appear to have brought the discipline to the 
point where the concepts of symbol manipu-
lation on internal mental representation that 
Gardner deemed the highest achievement of 
the discipline and the marginalization of cul-
ture and context would both undergo concerted 
attacks that makes it now possible to speak of 
a “new generation” of cognitive science that 
comes much closer to realizing the ideal of 
the cognitive hexagon than anyone anticipated 
even a decade ago.
I am not competent to survey all of the 
major changes that have occurred in cogni-
tive science over the decade since Gardner 
wrote his highly informative description of 
the fi eld and thoughts on its future. Rather, I 
want to focus specifi cally on the changing role 
of culture in contemporary cognitive science 
theories, and even more specifi cally on the line 
of thinking that grew up at UCSD. For any-
one interested in thinking about how to build 
a cognitive science, perhaps my account can 
be useful, in particular if you are interested in 
making the study of culture in mind an intimate 
part of how you conceive your strategy. The 
experience of UCSD is also, I would argue, 
interesting in itself because of the unique con-
tributions made by UCSD scholars to the study 
of culture as an intrinsically necessary part of 
cognitive science.
CHIP: 
The Medium of Discussion
I arrived at UCSD in the summer of 1978 after 
9 years in the behavioral science group at the 
Rockefeller University. Trained several years 
earlier in mathematical learning theory by Wil-
liam Estes, my laboratory mixed experimen-
tal, comparative, cross-cultural studies with an 
increasingly ecologically-oriented approach in 
which I began to study cognition in ways that 
mixed experimental and ethnographic meth-
ods. This latter trend brought me together with 
George Miller, whose laboratory for the study 
of language acquisition served simultaneously 
as my laboratory for the study of cognitive task 
specifi cation in non-laboratory settings.
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By virtue of proximity, I had been present 
for many of the Sloan Foundation meetings. It 
was my view that anthropologists were going to 
have a diffi cult time getting their voices heard, 
except in so far as the discipline restricted itself 
to a particular form of “cognitive anthropol-
ogy” which sought to specify the systems of 
concepts that represent the content of cultural 
knowledge. While I found this work interest-
ing and important, and I had used several of 
the associated methods in my own prior work, 
I was bothered by the absence of a different 
side of cognitive anthropology, one in which 
the socio-culturally organized environment in 
all of its materiality and sensitivity to locally 
constructed contexts plays an important role 
in how cognition works.
When I came to UCSD in 1978, becoming 
involved in cognitive science was not one of 
my imagined goals. But I was very interested 
in the work of several UCSD faculty in psy-
chology, anthropology, and sociology, which, 
I thought, provided a really interesting intel-
lectual environment for working out a way to 
see culture and context co-equal constituents 
with representation and information processing 
in how one conceives of the function of human 
psychological processes.
During the 1978-1979 academic year, 
I organized a seminar that included Aaron 
Cicourel, Roy D’Andrade, George and Jean 
Mandler, Don Norman, Bud Mehan, and Dave 
Rumelhart to explore ways to bring notions 
of cognition and notions of cultural context 
together within a single framework. Shortly 
thereafter, Don Norman, who played an essen-
tial role in institutionalizing Cognitive Science, 
created a cognitive science program which was 
the breeding ground for Parallel Distributed 
Processing models and the development of 
connectionism. All of the members of our 
cognition and context seminar participated.
The fi rst products of these interactions 
(which Don characterized as “fi erce and use-
ful” (Norman 1980), p. 31) appeared in print 
in 1980 when Don published “Twelve issues 
for Cognitive Science” in the journal, Cogni-
tive Science, which became the offi cial organ 
of the new Cognitive Science Society. Don’s 
twelve issues are worth listing for what they 
tell us about how culture did and did not enter 
into his thinking about the discipline he envi-
sioned (See Table 1).
The most conspicuous way that culture en-
ters this list is in the fi rst entry, belief systems. 
The late 1970’s were a time when both cogni-
tive psychologists and cognitive anthropol-
ogists were interested in such concepts as sche-
ma, script, and story grammars, conceived of 
as structured internal representations. In this 
form, culture fi t comfortably into the fi eld as 
Don then conceived of it. The important work 
of Roy D’Andrade on cultural models as cogni-
tive schemas provides an outstanding example 
of this approach (D’Andrade and Posner, 1989). 
Assuming that culture entered cognition in the 
form of cultural schemas, Don was able to pic-
ture his overall conception of the cognitive sys-
tem in the following diagram (Figure 2).
I was not happy with the characterization 
of the basic constituents of the model Don 
presented, and the ensuing discussions made 
Table 1. Don Norman’s (1980) 12 Issues for Cognitive Science 
Belief Systems Emotion Learning Performance 
Consciousness Interaction Memory Skill 
Development Language Perception Thought 
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enough of an impression on him to motivate 
him to tack a discussion of “The environmen-
tal system and cultural knowledge” onto his 
twelve issues. The core of my argument was 
that he needed to consider the Environmental 
System (ES), consisting of physical and social 
parts, as an equal partner in giving shape to 
the super-system comprised of RS and PCS 
(The regulatory and so-called pure cognitive 
systems).
This re-conceptualization, I argued, would 
enable Don to make a much stronger case for 
the relevance of evolutionary neuroscience, 
developmental psychology, and cognitive an-
thropology. Why? Because the mature system 
that encompasses RS and PCS must develop 
through a series of interactions between the 
RS and the ES. The PCS should be seen as 
an evolving adaptation. Where does culture 
enter? At some point it becomes part of the 
ES, one with an external source of memory 
over generations to supplement the “memory” 
built in by evolution.
“… What culturally organized knowledge does is 
to carry a lot of information for us … so a lot of 
the processes that experiments require to be done 
in the head can be, and is, short-circuited in real 
life … One issue is how to describe cognition as an 
interaction between the head and the world where 
some of the thought power resides in each locus” 
(Quoted in Norman, 1980, p. 28).
Several years later, Don, infl uenced primarily, 
I believe, by Ed Hutchins, came more and more 
to take seriously the role of the culturally or-
ganized environment of cognition. In 1988 he 
published The Psychology of Everyday Things, 
and in 1993, Things That Make Us Smart. In 
this and corollary work, Don and Ed Hutch-
ins promoted the idea of “distributed cogni-
tion,” an idea to which I will return because 
it provides one important way of articulating 
a view of cognitive science in which culture 
is seen to play a central role. A key concept 
around which our discussions revolved, and 
one which provides clear links back to the 
classical origins of cognitive science, in ad-
dition to providing a natural way to include 
culture in cognitive science, was the idea of 
an artifact.
Artifacts in The 
Science of the Artifi cial
My own approach to thinking about artifacts 
owes its origins to that branch of scholarship 
referred to as cultural-historical psychology 
(Chaiklin and Hedegaard, 1999) or as I and 
my colleagues have come to conceive of it as 
cultural-historical activity theory (Engeström, 
Miettinen et al. 1999). It is one of a broad fam-
ily of theories that take the mediation of human 
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ment in the constitution of human mind. My 
entry into this way of thinking starts from 
the Russian tradition initiated by Vygotsky, 
Luria, Leontiev, and their colleagues, and the 
American tradition represented by John Dewey 
and George Herbert Mead. It incorporates the 
work of Bakhtin, a literary/cultural theorist, 
Ilyenkov, a philosopher, Kenneth Burke, a 
philosopher/literary theorist, and Gregory 
Bateson, ecologist of the mind, as well as re-
lated traditions from Germany, Scandinavia, 
England, France, and other parts of Europe.
According to this view, an artifact is an 
aspect of the material world that has been 
modifi ed over the history of its incorporation 
in goal directed human action. By virtue of 
the changes wrought in the process of their 
creation and use, artifacts are simultaneously 
ideal (conceptual) and material. Artifacts are 
material objects, created in the process of goal 
directed human actions. They are ideal in that 
their material form has been shaped by their 
participation in the interactions of which they 
were previously a part and which they mediate 
in the present.
I do not think it an exaggeration to say 
that from this perspective, human thinking is 
artifi cial. Human thought can be conceived 
as the deformation of “naturally occurring” 
behavior, that is, behavior not mediated by 
culture. The acquisition of culture and the ac-
quisition of thought are part of a single proc-
ess, both in the normal thinking of adults and 
in the process of hominization. However, this 
assumption only sets the stage for addressing 
the relationship between cultural-historical 
psychology and the scientifi c enterprise called 
Cognitive Science.
The Artifact in Classical AI
It is instructive to compare this conception of 
artifact-mediated mind with the conception of 
artifacts found in one of the undisputed pro-
genitors of cognitive science, the study of arti-
fi cial intelligence. To psychologists and the lay 
public alike, the notion of artifi cial intelligence 
conjures up the image of a digital computer, 
programmed to implement a formal symbol-
manipulating system that solves recognizable 
problems. In many interpretations, physical 
symbol systems embodied in computers are 
thought of as analogous to, if not direct models 
of, the operation of the human brain (Gard-
ner, 1985; Newell, Rosenbloom et al. 1989). A 
diffi culty with the classical AI view from the 
perspective of a cultural-historical approach to 
mind, as many have pointed out, is that it ad-
heres to a strong Cartesian separation between 
what is outside and what is inside the mind. 
(So, for example, Alan Newell, Rosenbloom, 
and Laird, 1989, p. 107, could write: “Sym-
bol systems are an interior milieu, protected 
from the external world, in which information 
processing in the service of the organism can 
proceed”). This strong separation between out-
side and inside provides an important differ-
ence between classical AI and the position that 
Don developed on the one hand, and my own 
version of a cultural-historical approach.
Simon’s defi nition 
of the artifi cial
In his infl uential monograph, The Sciences of 
the Artifi cial (1981) Herbert Simon provided 
a canonical AI account of the study of human 
thought within the discipline of artifi cial in-
telligence. He took as his central concern the 
family of artifacts called physical symbol sys-
tems. “Symbol systems,” he wrote, “are almost 
the quintessential artifacts, for adaptivity to 
the environment is their whole raison d’etre 
(Simon 1981, p. 27).
Simon offers four criteria that distinguish 
the artifi cial from the natural:
1. Artifactual things are synthesized (though 
not always or usefully with full forethought) 
by man.
2. Artifi cial things may imitate appearances 
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in natural things while lacking, in one or 
many respects, the reality of the latter.
3. Artifi cial things can be characterized in 
terms of functions, goals, adaptation
4. Artifi cial things are often discussed, par-
ticularly when they are being designed, in 
terms of imperatives as well as descriptives 
(1981, p. 8).
Simon’s equation of the artifactual with things 
synthetic reveals a deep affi nity between these 
two concepts. To be synthetic, according to 
Webster’s dictionary, means to be “produced 
by chemical synthesis, rather than of natural 
origin; not real or genuine; artifi cial.” So in 
dealing with creatures whose minds are made 
through artifacts, we are dealing with hybrids, 
part natural, part cultural-historical.
Points 2-4 also provide interesting points 
of contact between Simon’s notion of artifi -
cial, and the notion of artifact that comes out 
of cultural-historical theory. Artifacts are, in 
some respects, models. Their structures carry 
within them, so to speak, a “theory” of both 
the human who is using them and the range 
of environmental circumstances in which they 
will be normatively used. Every axe and ham-
mer, for example, embodies such a theory in its 
length, its shape, its size, its weight as a syn-
thesized ensemble that satisfi ces the constraints 
of the human user and the task at hand. At the 
same time artifacts are transformers, enabling 
the metamorphoses of what we refer to as 
external into internal and vice versa. Because 
they enter intimately into human goal directed 
action, there is a functional aspect to all arti-
fact-mediated action. And for the same reasons 
artifacts embody values (oughts, shoulds, and 
musts); in this sense all culturally mediated 
action is, at least implicitly, moral action.
I take Simon’s characterization of artifacts 
to be compatible with a cultural-historical ap-
proach to human psychological functioning 
so long as we realize that none of his criteria 
justifi es, let alone requires, the reduction of 
artifi cial intelligence to an inside-the-head, cut-
off-from-the-world, physical symbol system. 
Nor need the criteria be embodied in comput-
ers. As Don Norman and Ed Hutchins have 
amply demonstrated, many systems of activ-
ity, such as those engaged in by 747 pilots, fi ll 
Simon’s criteria quite adequately.
Cognitive Artifacts
In 1990, Don wrote a paper entitled “Cogni-
tive artifacts.” His goal, as he expressed it, was 
to emphasize the information processing role 
played by physical artifacts upon the cognition 
of the individual – hence the term, “cognitive 
artifact.” “Here, I will not be concerned with 
how they are invented, acquired, or transmitted 
across individuals or generations. The goal is 
to integrate artifacts into the existing theory of 
human cognition (Norman 1991, p. 2).
This passage, and the ensuing discussion, 
are important because they pinpoint two key 
ways in which Don’s approach differed from 
my own, despite a growing area of conver-
gence in our ways of thinking. First, I call at-
tention to the idea that cognitive artifacts “play 
a role upon the cognition of the individual.” 
Here we see the persistence of a deep intuition 
that thought is an autonomous human activ-
ity and that artifacts are somehow external 
to human thought, acting upon it, rather than 
participating in it and constituting it. This in-
tuition is inscribed, as well, in the diagrams 
that Don provided to contrast two views of 
artifacts, what he called the personal and the 
system views (see Figures 3 and 4).
As indicated in the passage I have quoted, 
as well as the fi gure legends to the two fi g-
ures, there is no intrinsic relationship between 
thought and artifact. Rather, artifacts are placed 
squarely “outside” the cognitive system, act-
ing upon it. From the former view, artifacts 
enhance cognition, from the latter view they 
simplify the task, but the basic schism between 
task and cognition remains unaffected. Cogni-
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Figure 3 and 4
tion is a process occurring in individual heads 
and the basic stimulus-response paradigm re-
mains in place. Ed Hutchins, who worked 
closely with Don during this period, arrived 
at a different way of looking at artifacts that I 
believe to be a variant of my own approach. On 
the basis of extensive research on the work of 
airplane pilots, Ed began to evoke the notion 
of a “functional system”, which he adapted 
from the writings of Alexander Luria. Instead 
of viewing individuals, artifacts, and tasks as 
independent entities, Ed argued that the proc-
ess of human thinking entails bringing differ-
ent sub-systems into coordination with each 
other. As a consequence, the basic processes 
of cognition are organized differently by dif-
ferent task conception:
The really important insight here is that some of the 
systems that are brought into coordination in think-
ing may be outside the usually conceived bounda-
ries of the person. Such a system of complex (and 
dynamic) coordination of other systems is a “func-
tional system”. Different functional systems are set 
up in the performance of different tasks, and, since 
the functional system may include coordination 
with symbolic systems outside the person, a change 
in the symbolic resources may lead to a reconfi gura-
tion of thinking (Hutchins, 2000, p. 4).
Within this framework, cognitive artifacts do 
not simply act on the individual, they are con-
stitutive of the information processing mecha-
nisms that cognitive science takes as its object 
of study. Elaborating on this view in a recent 
article on cognitive artifacts, Hutchins makes 
the incestuous connections between cogni-
tion, cognitive artifacts, tasks, and the broader 
socio-cultural environment explicit:
Cognitive artifacts are always embedded in larger 
socio-cultural systems that organize the practices 
in which they are used. The utility of a cognitive 
artifact depends upon other processes that create the 
conditions and exploit the consequences of its use. 
In culturally elaborated activities, partial solutions 
are often crystallized in practices, in knowledge, 
and in social arrangements (Hutchins 1999, p. 4).
Ed brings two sources of data to bear upon 
this alternative, “distributed cognition” view 
which makes artifacts constitutive of thought, 
not clearly parsable into internal and external in-
fl uences. First, there are careful “cognitive ethno-
graphies” of a variety of work-related activities 
such as navigating a large naval vessel or fl ying 
an airplane. Second, there are implementations 
of connectionist models (“individuals”) that are 
placed in interaction with each other, and which, 
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in Ed’s most recent work, include interactions 
with the products of past interactions (artifacts), 
thereby instantiating in computer simulations 
the process of cultural mediation as intrinsic to 
human cognitive processes. An important idea 
to come from this latter work is the possibility 
that there may be jointly achieved, interpsycho-
logical functions which are suffi ciently com-
plicated that they never become independently 
realizable individual psychological functions, 
but can only be achieved as joint, mediated, ac-
tivity in context. Needless to say, this possibility 
severely undermines reliance on the individual 
human mind, let alone the individual human 
brain, as the locus of cognition.
From Cognitive Artifacts 
to the Fifth Dimension
I believe that the path of my own work is 
consistent with the distributed cognition tra-
dition. However, it explores another part of 
the spectrum of possible ways to investigate 
the mediation of human activity by “intelli-
gent devices” into which enormous reserves 
of cultural understanding have been forged 
and it deals directly with the issue of devel-
opment that was included in Don’s twelve 
issues, but thereafter more or less ignored. I 
focus on child development and in particular 
on the period of middle childhood. Further, 
within that age-defi ned domain, I study de-
velopment outside of the school, in marginal 
community organizations such as youth clubs, 
church groups, and afterschool extended-day 
educational programs.
My method is also different. When Ed 
Hutchins studies an existing functional sys-
tem of activity such as an airplane cockpit, he 
does not pretend to be an invisible participant, 
and in Ed’s case, he has “gone native” to be 
certifi ed as a pilot so that he can learn about the 
system from the inside out. However, in most 
cases, participant observers are not responsible 
for the existence of the system they study. By 
virtue of the fact that it is a “real world” system 
they are investigating (an important virtue, be-
cause it displays the utility/believability of the 
theory), the activity they study would exist if 
they were not there to observe it; the ongoing 
activity of the observer does not require their 
participation.
By contrast, my students, colleagues, and I 
literally create the systems of activity that are 
the focus of our research. We are participant 
observers in a quite unique way. In this, I be-
lieve we are invoking an idea that has been 
common to both the cultural-historical tradi-
tion and to the study of artifi cial intelligence: 
you can best understand something you have 
made. However, we do not embody this princi-
ple by writing computer models of parallel dis-
tributed processing models that incorporate a 
mixture of natural and cultural processes or by 
conducting ethnographic observations of com-
plex work settings in which computer-based 
cognitive artifacts are treated as elements in 
a functional system of artifi cial intelligence. 
Instead, we design systems of activity which 
embody principles of cultural-historical psy-
chology and test our theories by their ability 
to create the forms of transformation that the 
theory takes as its central processes.
My approach differs from that of others cur-
rently working on the role of culture in mind 
via the study of artifact-mediated activity in 
another respect. Recall Don Norman’s caveat 
that he was not engaged in the study of how 
artifacts are created, acquired or transmitted. 
From the perspective of a cultural-historical ap-
proach to cognition, this restriction has serious, 
negative, consequences. If, as Ed Hutchin’s 
argues, cognition is a process of the propaga-
tion of structure across media within complex, 
dynamic, functional systems, then knowledge 
of the processes of transformation over time is 
vital to understanding how artifacts enter into 
the process of human thought. This process of 
transformation cannot be focused entirely on 
artifacts themselves. Rather, it must also lay 
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bare for analysis the way in which an object/
activity and its context develop as part of a 
single process of change.
I refer to the activity systems I design as 
tertiary artifacts, following Marx Wartofsky 
(Wartofsky, 1973). Wartofsky identifi ed as 
tertiary a special class of artifacts “… which 
can come to constitute a relatively autonomous 
‘world’, in which the rules, conventions and 
outcomes no longer appear directly practical, 
or which, indeed, seem to constitute an arena 
of non-practical, or ‘free’ play or game activ-
ity” (p. 208). Engagement with such imag-
ined worlds, he suggests, can come to color 
the way we see the “actual” world, providing 
a tool for changing current praxis. In modern 
psychological jargon, modes of behavior ac-
quired when interacting with tertiary artifacts 
can transfer beyond the immediate contexts of 
their use. Wartofsky applies his conception of 
tertiary artifacts to works of art and processes 
of perception; I want to generalize his concep-
tion to include specially designed systems of 
activities for children. I call the systems we 
design, implement, and seek to sustain, “5th 
Dimensions.”
The Fifth Dimension was designed to be 
an educational activity system that offers 
school aged children a specially designed 
environment in which to explore a variety of 
off-the-shelf computer games and game-like 
educational activities during the after school 
hours (at present, it is also implemented as part 
of the curriculum in some schools). This activ-
ity is participated in by undergraduates from 
a college or university. The computer games 
are a part of a make-believe play world that 
includes non-computer games like origami, 
chess, and mancala (the West African board 
game) and a variety of other artifacts. “Task 
cards” or “adventure guides” written by project 
staff members for each game are designed to 
help participants (both children and under-
graduate students) orient to the game, to form 
goals, and to chart progress toward becoming 
an expert. The task cards provide a variety of 
requirements to externalize, refl ect upon and 
criticize information, to write to someone, to 
look up information in an encyclopedia, and 
to teach someone else what one has learned, 
in addition to the intellectual tasks written into 
the software or game activity itself.
As a means of distributing the children’s 
and undergraduates’ use of the various games 
the Fifth Dimension contains a table-top or 
wall chart “maze” which permits distribution 
of activities in a fl exible manner. This distribu-
tion device consists of some 20 “rooms”. Each 
room provides access to two or more games, 
and the children may choose which games to 
play as they enter each room.
There is an electronic entity (a wizard/
wizardess, Maga, Golem, Proteo – depending 
upon the locally constructed mythology) who 
is said to live in the Internet. The entity writes 
to (and sometimes chats with) the children and 
undergraduates via the Internet. In the mythol-
ogy of the Fifth Dimension, the wizard/ess acts 
as the participants’ patron, provider of games, 
mediator of disputes, and the source of com-
puter glitches and other misfortunes.
Because it is located in a community insti-
tution, the Fifth Dimension activities require 
the presence of a local “site coordinator” who 
greets the participants as they arrive and super-
vises the fl ow of activity in the room. The site 
coordinator is trained to recognize and support 
the pedagogical ideals and curricular practices 
that mark the Fifth Dimension as “different”- 
a different way for kids to use computers, a 
different way of playing with other children, 
and a different way for adults to interact with 
children.
The presence of university and college 
students is a major draw for the children. The 
participating college students are enrolled in 
a course focused on fi eldwork in a community 
setting. At UC San Diego, an institution that 
emphasizes research, the university course 
associated with student participation is an 
40143_Outlines_2003   13 17/01/04, 14:07:55
14
intensive, 6 unit class that emphasizes deep 
understanding of basic developmental princi-
ples, the use of new information technologies 
for organizing learning, and writing fi eldnotes 
and research papers. The undergraduates write 
papers about the development of individual 
children, the educative value of different 
games, differences in the ways that boys and 
girls participate in the play world, variations 
in language use and site culture, and other top-
ics that bring regular course work and fi eld 
observations together. Different arrange-
ments for undergraduate courses exist at each 
of the sites, depending upon local needs (see 
www.uclinks.org for descriptions of currently 
existing sites and research foci).
By virtue of their socio-ecological loca-
tion, children cannot be compelled to attend 
a 5thDimension, they must come voluntarily, 
choosing this over other potential activities. 
As a consequence, a design feature common 
to all 5thDimensions is that they mix play and 
academically oriented activities. More than a 
decade of research designing, implementing, 
and seeking to sustain 5thDimensions has 
strongly reinforced my view that they can 
usefully be interpreted as systems of artifi cial 
intelligence, saturated with cognitive artifacts, 
in interaction with which children and adults 
can behave more intelligently (adaptively) in 
a wide variety of circumstances.
With respect to the child participants, time 
spent inhabiting the 5thDimension has been 
demonstrated to produce increased perform-
ance on a variety of standard and specially 
designed problem solving and information 
processing tasks as well as increased social-in-
teractional skills (this evidence is summarized 
in many papers and monographs obtainable 
through www.uclinks.org). For undergraduate 
students who participate in the 5thDimension, 
the experience brings about deeper conceptual 
understanding of the principles of learning and 
development as well as increased self confi -
dence in dealing with children and technol-
ogy. For the researchers, the 5thDimension 
provides a unique medium for understanding 
ontogeny as the emergent product of micro-
genesis and cultural-historical change in pat-
terned cultural practices. We have been able 
to document the processes of artifact-mediated 
interaction that give rise to these consequences, 
providing evidence for the underlying theory 
and design principles. Comparative analysis 
of 5thDimensions in different institutional 
settings has clearly shown that although they 
start from a common set of elements and nor-
mative rules, each of the systems we “plant” 
in a new institutional setting becomes a unique 
synthesis of the initial set of artifacts and its 
specifi c cultural-historical location.
Concluding Remarks
In a brief article such as this, which seeks to 
cover a lot of ground, it is impossible to do 
justice to the all of the topics I have raised, 
many of which could have taken up the allotted 
space by themselves. My goal has been to sug-
gest that the topic of culture as conceived of by 
cultural-historical approaches and in cognitive 
science is worthy of consideration in thinking 
about the development of both disciplines. If 
the general position I have put forth is cor-
rect, a cognitive science that proceeds without 
taking the human need and ability to mediate 
thought through artifacts, including artifi cially 
designed systems of activity, will prove lim-
ited in both theory and practice. As Andy 
Clark notes in his recent book, Being There, 
evidence concerning the intimate role of the 
environment in thought processes implies that 
classical AI “bundles into the machine a set of 
operational capacities which in real life emerge 
only from the interactions between machine 
(brain) and world (Clark 1997, p. 64)”. Put 
even more bluntly, Ed Hutchins argues that an 
a-cultural cognitive science errs in “mistaking 
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the properties of the sociocultural system for 
the properties of the person” (p. 366).
On the positive side, a cognitive science 
which does include artifact mediation in cul-
tural historical context as part of its fundamen-
tal toolkit makes excellent contact with current 
attempts to understand human thought as the 
embodied activity of active agents, embed-
ded in environments which are also active, 
embodied agents.
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